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REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE
FOR AN EFFECTIVE PUBLICATION RULE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Committee Mandate, Composition, and Functionins
Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird appointed the
Advisory Committee for an Effective Publication Rule in
September 1978, charging it with carefully reviewing all
aspects of California's selective publication system and
making recommendations to improve its workability.
The 18 members of the corr~ittee represent a wide
range of vie~~oints on the wisdom and effectiveness of selective publication. Many have been interested in the operation of the system for some time.!/ This experience and
diversity of views permitted the committee to conduct its
deliberations reasonably expeditiously yet thoroughly.
The committee held two public hearings and solicited
comments from the public and from l:UJ.uerous groups and individuals.~/ 'I'he persons who appeared at the hearings or submitted written views included prosecutors, public defenders,
other government and private attorneys, bar association representatives, judges, appellate scholars, and representatives
of legal publishing houses and a computerized legal research
service.
Selective publication, initiated in California in
1963, has more recently been adopted by federal and some
state appellate courts. The committee reviewed prior California reports and literature, the rules in other jurisdictions, and the legal literaturelf on selective publication.

1/
~./
3/

A list of the members which summarizes prior involvement in selective publication may be found in Appendix
E to this report.
A list of organizations contacted appears in Appendix D.
This literature reveals selective publication schemes
have proliferated, they have also become more varied.
Furthermore, the recent trend of legal scholarship
seems to be toward increased criticism of these systems.
A bibliography of recent literature on state and federal limited publication schemes appears in Appendix C
to this report.

Based on the information gathered from hearings,
letters, scholarly literature, and its own members' experience, the committee held a series of discussion meetings to
analyze every facet of the system of selective publication.
Stnnmary of Conclusions and Recommendations
The major topics addressed in this report are the
following:
0

0

0

0

0

Access to Unpublished Opinions
(Part II, pp. 8-15)
Citation of Unpublished Opinions
(Part III, pp. 16-19)
Publication Standards {Part IV, pp. 20-23)
Publication Procedures, including Supreme
Court Decertification, Initial Publication
Decision, and Requests for Publication
(Parts V and VI, pp. 24-30)
Partial Publication {Part VII, pp. 31-33)

The committee's initial conclusion is that areturn to full publication in·official format is impractical
because of the great volume of court of appeal opinions.
Modifications in the present system are, however, needed to
improve its operation and to overcome various practical and
theoretical shortcomings of selective publication.
Publication of appellate court opinions serves
many purposes. It enables courts, lawyers and litigants to
know the law so that they may make uniform and predictable
·decisions. lt also informs the public of the law, giving
fair notice of rights and duties. Publication also exposes
to public and scholarly scrutiny the philosophical views
and analytical abilities of the judges. In short, legal
doctrine can best be understood, interpreted, acted upon,
criticized, and changed through publication of opinions.
From this perspective, limiting publication of opinions is subject to numerous theoretical and practical criticisms. The former include the contentions that selective publication contributes to popular distrust of the courts; creates
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inequality of access to case law by making pertinent unpublished opinions available largely only to institutional
and specialized lawyers; limits the Supreme Court's ability
to correct inconsistent appellate decisions where there is
no petition for hearing; deprives trial judges, lawyers,
litigants and members of society of guidance; and decreases
trial court compliance with the law, thus contributinG to increased appellate litigation. 4 /
.
California's selective publication scheme is also
subject to criticism on the practical grounds that the
criteria for publication are applied unevenly; cases that
qualify for publication remain unpublished; the citation
ban does not neutralize the advantges of privileged access,
since it does not prevent the use of the language and the
reasoning of unpublished opinions; the procedure for requesting publication works unequally since only the parties and
institutional litigants have practical access to unpublished
opinions, and they frequently do not have an interest in
seeking publication; the Supreme Court frequently decertifies published opinions which qualify under the standards.
Despite these problems, the volume of appellate
decisions precludes a return to full publication of all
opinions in the current format of the official reports. It
is estimated that publication of the entire output of the
California Courts of Appeal would increase the number of
volumes of official reports issued each year from about 12
to more than 60.~ The costs of such a flood of books, in
terms of purchasing the books themselves, finding library
space to house them, and taking the time to research and
read cases, would be prohibitive. Full publication in the
present official format is simply impractical.

4/

~/

Between fiscal 1966-1967 and 1976-1977, the number of
majority opinions issued annually by the California
Courts of Appeal increased from 2,444 to 6,003, a rise
of 146 percent. Judicial Council (1978) Annual Report,
Table VIII, p. 71.
Conference Committee Report on 1974 Conference Resolut~on No. 11-18 (1976) 51 State Bar J. 400, 402.
3

This is not, however, the end of the matter. Modificiations are feasible and desirable to improve California's
selective publication system and to correct the problems
outlined above.
The major improvement for a more practical and
workable system is provision of full and ready access to the
entire corpus of unpublished opinions. Allowing interested
lawyers, judges, scholars, and members of the public to find
and obtain copies of unpublished opinions will help to make
the system work more efficiently and fairly. Full access will
combat the problem of unequal availability of opinions more
effectively than does the noncitation rule; it will facilitate greater and more balanced use of the procedure for requesting publication; it will encourage proper observance
of the standards for publication by the courts of appeal
in the certification process and by the Supreme Court in
the decertification process.
Full access will also help mitigate the harsh
side effects of selective publication. It should decrease
public suspicions of improperly motivated suppression; in
conjunction with proposed citability of unpublished opinions
on petition for hearing in the Supreme Court, access will
also permit the Supreme Court to detect and correct inconsistencies in unpublished decisions; it will also discourage divergent decisions and save effort by making colleagues'
work available to court of appeal justices; trial court,
attorney and litigant compliance with appellate law \•Till
also be increased; and legal advocacy will be improved.
The remaining committee recommendations also aim
to improve workability and to mitigate side effects while
retaining the practical advantages of selective publication.
The committee recommends that the noncitation rule
be amended to permit citation of unpublished opinions in
petitions for hearing in the Supreme Court and citation of
unpublished opinions of the appellate departments of the
superior courts in those departments and in the municipal
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and justice courts in the same county. The standards for
publication should, in the committee's view, be amended to
include fact cases of first impression, dissenting and reasoned concurring opinions, opinions creating or resolving
legal confiicts, and those that make significant research
or analytical contributions to the law. The committee recommends that more specific requirements govern the request for
publication procedure; that the Supreme Court use decertification only to enforce the standards for publication; that
published opinions be retained in the official reports following grant of hearing by the Supreme Court; and that the Court
engage in selective review. Finally, the committee reco~~ends
testing of proposals for partial publication.
of the Cowmittee's Recommendations
Access
An index to unpublished opinions should be establised to provide convenient and inexpensive access to them.
Such index and copies of all unpublished opinions should be
made available to members of the public, lawyers, judges and
scholars at convenient locations throughout the state. An
inquiry should immediately be undertaken to identify and
evaluate possible methods for providing a convenient and inexpensive indexing and copy storage and supply system for
unpublished opinions.
Noncitation
A modified noncitation rule should be retained for
the present; if an inexpensive, convenient access system
proves feasible, the policy of noncitation should be reconsidered. Rule 977 should be amended to permit citation of unpublished court of appeal opinions in connection with petitions for hearing in the Supreme Court, whenever it appears
that an unpublished opinion conflicts with the case in which
review is sought; to permit citation of unpublished opin~ons
of appellate departments of the superior courts in those departments and in the municipal and justice courts within the

5

same county; and to require that copies of unpublished opinions intended for citation be furnished in advance to court
and all parties. Ethical questions involving noncitation
should be addressed to the State Bar.
Publication Standards
The publication standards in rule 976, subdivision (b),
should be amended to provide for publication of opinions that apply established rules of law to factual situations significantly
different from those in published cases; opinions that resolve or
create conflicts in the law; opinions in cases involving dissenting opinions or concurring opinions in which reasons are stated;
opinions th<:tt reversE? administrative agency decisions based
on a rule of law or interpretation of administrative rules;
opinions that make a significant contribution to legal literature by undertakingan historical review of the law or describing legislative history; and opinions that otherwise aid
the administration of justice. The presumption against publication should be removed from rule 976, subdivision (b).
Supreme Court Procedures
Rule 976, subdivision (c), should be amended to
provide that in exercising its power to order opinions published or not published, the Supreme Court shall observe the
standards for publication specified in subdivision (b). The
Supreme Court should review its forn1er practice of withholding approval of erroneous portions of court of appeal opinions on denial of hearings. Rule 976, subdivision (d) should
be amended to delete the language that requires nonpublication of published court of appeal opinions in cases in which
the Supreme Court grants review, and the Supreme Court should
engage in selective review of specific issues in court of appeal opinions.
Requests for Publication
Rule 978, subdivision (a), should be amended to
require the court of appeal to send a copy of its recommendation and statement of reasons regarding a request
for publication to all parties and to any other person

6

who has requested publication. Rule 978, subdivision (b),
should be amended to provide that the Supreme Court shall
dispose of requests for publication promptly and that
each party to the action and any other person who has requested publication shall be notified of the action taken
by the Supreme Court. Filing systems should be developed
in court clerks' offices to insure proper handling of requests for publication.
Partial Publication
Proposals for partial publication of op~n~ons
should be given further study, including developing and
carrying out pilot projects to test and evaluate them in
practice.
DATED:

May 15, 1979

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
THOMciS W. CALDECOTT
SHELDON PORTMAN
ROBER'r GARDNER*
BERNAHD S. JEFFERSON
VAINO H. SPENCER
Hm·1ER B. THOt-1PSON
MICHAEL M. BERGER**
WILLill..M C. CUNNINGHAM
GLORIA DEHART
ROBERT FOru~ICHI***
JOSEPH FREITAS, JR.
ELLIS J. HORVITZ***
MYRON JACOBSTEIN
GIDEON KANNER**
EDWARD L. LASCHER**
RODERICK H. ROSE
LEONARD SACKS***
CHARLES M. SEVILLA*

*

**

***

I concur in all parts of the co~~ittee's report save
the recommendation that all cases involving a dissenting or reasoned concurring opinion be published. See
minority report, pp. 35-38.
I concur in all parts of the committee's report save the
interim recommendation to retain a modified citation ban.
See minority report, pp. 39-43.
I concur in all parts of the committee's report save the
recommendation that published court of appeal opinions
not be decertified upon grant of hea~ing by the California Supreme Court. See minority report, pp. 44-48.
7

II.

ACCESS TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

Introduction
Selective publication of appellate court opinions
necessarily results in unequal access to unpublished opinions. Rule 977 of the California Rules of Court, which prohibits citation of unpublished opinions, was adopted to
minimize the advantage of superior access by institutional
litigators. For this reason, past discussions of access
have primarily focused on noncitation.~/ However, the issue
of access involves problems and solutions beyond citation;
consequently, access will be analyzed independently of
noncitation. 7/
The committee concludes that easing access to unpublished opinions would make the work of appellate courts
more visible, more understandable and more useful to judges,
scholars, lawyers, and to the public generally, and would
also improve the workability of the selective publication
system. The committee recorr~ends:
AN INDEX TO ID~PUBLISHED OPINIONS SHOULD
BE ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE CONVENIENT AND INEXPENSIVE ACCESS TO THEM. SUCH INDEX N~D
COPIES OF ALL UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS SHOULD
BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ~ffiMBERS OF THE PUBLIC,
LAWYERS, JUDGES AND SCHOLARS AT COh~NIENT
LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE STATE.
Present Practice
At the present time, more than 85 percent of
the court of appeal opinions issued each year are unpublished.~/ Within each appellate district, unpublished

6/·
7/
8/

See, e: g., se;ligs~m and Warnlof, ~ Use of Unreported
Cases ~n Cal~forn1a (1972) 24 Hast~ngs L.J. 37, 52-53.
Noncitation is discussed in the next section of this
report (pp. 16-19).
In fiscal 1977-1978, the courts of appeal filed written
opinions in 6,093 cases, and 12.9 percent of majority
opinions were published. Judicial council (1979) Annual Report, Tables VIII, p. 54; XV, p. 59.
8

opinions are made part of the file record of completed
cases. When accumulated closed case files exceed the storage
capacity of the district clerk's office, they are shipped to
the State Records Center or State Archives in Sacramento for
permanent storage.

In addition, one copy of each unpub-

lished opinion is transmitted to the office of the Reporter
These

of Decisions for the Supreme Court in San Francisco.
copies are stored by district and date of decision.

While

the Reporter's office can retrieve specifically identified
cases on request, it does not have the personnel to perform
this service for the general public, and it cannot retrieve
cases according to subject matter or code section numbers.
In sum, while the 5,000 or more unpublished court
of appeal opinions issued each year are technically available for review by anyone interested in doing so, they are
not indexed or organized in a manner which would make them
realistically accessible:

as a practical matter, they are

totally unavailable to most attorneys, judges, scholars and
members of the public.
Disadvantages of Nonaccess; Advantages of Access
If unpublished opinions are, by virtue of rule
977, not generally citable, what difference does it make
whether or not they are indexed and made conveniently available?

In other words, why should an effort be made to

change the existing situation?

There are numerous reasons

for providing full access to unpublished cases absent citability.

These relate partly to the benefits such access

provides to the public and to judges, litigants, and scholars.

In addition, full availability is a more effective

means than the citation ban for equalizing access to unpublished opinions, and it facilitates operation of all aspects
of the selective publication system.
Recent years have brought increasing demands that
the work of the courts be opened to public scrutiny and
made more understandable to the public, and that the courts
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be shown to be accountable for their decisions.

One recent

response has been for the courts of appeal to compile and begin
to publish manuals describing their internal operating procedures and practices.

It would be equally desirable to have

the end product of the courts' work--their written decisions--similarly opened to convenient and
scrutiny.

ine~pensive

Mr. Witkin in his testimony before the committee

expressed the view that such practical access to unpublished
opinions is part of the program of making appellate court
operations generally more open and understandable.

Full

access can also help demonstrate to the public that the
appellate courts are carrying out their responsibility to
insure that justice is done at both the trial and the appellate levels.2/ And development of a practical index system
should banish the misconception that unpublished decisions
are intentionally suppressed.
In general terms, appellate judges need to know
their colleagues' output so as to avoid wasteful duplication
of effort and damaging doctrinal conflicts.

Trial judges

must know the status of controlling principles in order
to apply them accurately.lO/ Counsel engaged in planning
client conduct, contemplating filing or settling a suit, or
preparing an appeal have a similar need; scholars must be
able to spot trends that may be visible only through studying groups of routine cases; and litigants are entitled to
expect that the courts treat similarly situated persons
similarly.
Under the publication standards, an opinion applying an established principle to a routine fact situation

9/

See Do UnEublished Opinions ?amEe~ Justice? (1978) 64
A.B.A.J. 318 [summary of remarks of Arizona Chief Justice Cameron at A.B.A. mid-year meeting]; Smith~ A
Primer of O£inion Writin~ for Four New Judges (19G7) 21
Ark. B.A.J. 197, 200-201.

10/

See Rubin, Views from the Lower Court (1976} 23 U.C.L.A.
L.Rev. 448,~51-4~ ---

10

does not qualify for publication, for it is thought to be of
interest only to the trial judges and parties.

The fact is

that the patterns of such routine applications are of
general importance to judges, lawyers and scholars.

As one

witness before the committee observed, where a decision
handed

do~m

by the Supreme Court is consistently followed by

the lower courts, it will nevertheless appear to have been
ignored, for under the present scheme the decisions following it will be unpublished.

Thus, there will be no way to

follow its citation history. With the passage of years, no
one will be able to determine the precise ambit of the lead
case or whether its principle has, on the one hand, received
rigorous and consistent application by the lower courts and
thus is "well settled," or, on the other hand, whether it
has been consistently circumscribed and limited, or proved
11
unworkable in application. 1 Similarly, it will not be
possible to identify

configuration~

of decisions that show
emerging trends or legal problem areas . .J- 2 /
Lack of access to unpublished opinions works a
hardship on appellate attorneys which lessens the quality
and usefulness of the written and oral argument presented to
the courts of appeal.

It is a cardinal principle of

effec~

tive appellate advocacy to "know the panel" before which a
case is presented, that is, to know the views of the member
11/

The problem is that, in jurisprudential terms, a single
appellate decision, whether or not it purports to 1 does
not establish a broad scale "rule." It stands only for
the minimum proposition necessary to explain the outcome of the case. A series of decisions applying a
proposition is necessary to develop a rule sufficiently
broad to provide guidance for commonly recurring situations. See, e.g., Llewellyn (1960) The Bramble Bush
76-77; Landes and Posner, Legal Precedent: ~ Theoretical
and Empirical An~lysis (1976) 19 J. Law and Econ. 249,
249-250; Comment, A Snake in the Pat.h of the Lav1: The
Seventh Circuit's Non=puEliCatiOn Rule--(1977)~ u.--Pl.tt. L. Rev. 309, 311-312; Ch~lton, Ai?Pellate Court Reform:
The Premature Scalpel (1973) 48 State Bar J. 392,
470-472.

12/

Note, Selective Publication of Case Law (1966) 39 So.
Cal.L.Rev. 608, 609-611.
11

judges as expressed in their written opinions.

When five-

sixths of these opinions are not available, counsel cannot
achieve this goal.

Appellate counsel should not be placed

in the position of having to argue a particular application
or interpretation to a court without being able to discover
whether that court has decided the precise issue in an unpublished opinion.
Finally, full access will improve operation of the
entire selective publication scheme.

Private and govern-

mental attorney witnesses before the comn1ittee expressed
concern, documented with specific examples, that the courts
of appeal are not correctly or consistently applying the
standards for publication in rule 976.

Some committee mem-

bers and others have found this to be the case in their own
13 I
·
And stat1s
· t 1cs
·
·
l
.
· f 1cant
.
exper1ence.-cont1nue
to s1ow
s1gn1
discrepancies in the publication rate between and among
14
districts.
/
Providing convenient access to all unpublished
opinions would help to solve "this problem.

It would facil-

itate operation of this report's proposal (see p. 18) to
allow citation of conflicting court of appeal opinions on petitions for hearing to the Supreme Court. It would also permit
periodic audits to evaluate application of the standards for
publication.
13/ See, e.g., Kanner, The Unpublished Opinion: Friend or
Foe? (1973) 48 State Bar J. 386, 436-442 [identifyrn:g "publishable" unpublished eminent domain cases];
Lascher, Lascher at La~ge (1975) 50 id. 36; Weisgall,
St0£ 1
_ _ _ -~ize:
The Emerging Doctrine of Unfounded Dec1sion (1974) 9 U.S . .F'.L.Rev. 219, 253-25
[pub1is'hable unpublished cases in the area of founded
suspicion]. Cf. Comment, Decertification of AEpel1ate
9pinions: The Need for Art1c;:~J.a ted Jud1cia_;b_ Re<;tsoning
and Certain
Cal:!. forn1a r,aw (1977)50 So.
Ca1.L.Rev. 1181, 1188,-n. 40.
--14/ See Judicial Council (1979) Annual Report, supra, n. 8,
Table XV, p. _ .
That publishable decisions are sometimes not published
is also suggested by the fact that in almost one-third
(32.3 percent) of the cases involving opinions that
were granted hearing by the Supreme Court in calendar
1978, the court of appeal opinion was unpublished.
Staff analysis, copy on file with the committee.
12

Full access will also do a better job of dealing
with unequal availability of unpublished opinions than the
noncitation rule.

Despite rule 977, counsel privileged to

know about relevant unpublished opinions presently has a
distinct advantage over his adversary, for nothing is to
prevent him from arguing a favorable case's reasoning or
even using its very language to the court that decided it.
15
At the same time, he can ignore unfavorable opinions. / In
fact, the impact of unequal access is compounded by the
publication request procedure (rule 978) , for only one who
knows about a case is in a position to request publication,
but he will do so only when it favors his position.

Thus,

providing full access will also facilitate fairer and more
efficient operation of the publication request system.
~roaches

to

Provid~ng

For these reasons, the

Access
com~ittee1

as noted, has

recommended that an indexing and copy storage and supply
system be developed for access to unpublished opinions and
that the index and copies be made available in a convenient
and inexpensive manner in order to minimize the burdens of
16
research and retrieva1. /
Accordingly, the committee
recon1mends:
AN INQUIRY SHOULD IMMEDIATELY BE UNDERTAKEN TO IDENTIFY AND EVALUATE POSSIBLE
~1ETHODS FOR PROVIDING A COl'NENIENT AND INEXPENSIVE INDEXING AND COPY STORAGE AND SUPPLY
SYSTEM FOR UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.
15/

Based on public hearing testimony from private and
government attorneys, the committee is concerned with
ethical dilemmas posed by selective publication. For
example, what obligation does an attorney have to inform court or adversary of an unpublished opinion the
attorney knows to be advers~ to his position? The committee recommends:
ETHICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVING NONCITATION SHOULD
BE REFERRED TO THE STATE BAR FOR CONSIDERATION.

16/
-

In recommending practical access, the committee does
not mean to imply that counsel have an obligation to
research unpublished cases.

13

While it is beyond the scope of the committee's
charter and resources to recommend an exact format to accomplish these goals, it is appropriate to make the following suggestions based on matters presented to the committee
and committee deliberations.

There can be great variations

in the format, quality and cost of indexing systems. It may
be possible to develop a relatively limited and inexpensive
index which satisfies the practical needs of bar, bench,
academy and public.

On the other hand, examination of the

above-noted needs and uses of the access system may reveal
that a more complex and expensive system is required. 17 /
Accordingly, the first order of business should be to define
the specific indexing needs of the participants mentioned
above. Afterwards, a cost-utility decision can be made as
to ,.,hat type or types of index to develop. 18 /
The committee has received information about
several topical

for unpublished opinions that are

currently in operation.

Two ·handle the unpublished opinions

of the 1\ppellate Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court.
One is maintained by the court staff on three-by-five cardsi
the other, covering

criminal cases, is the work of Su-

perior Court Judge Saeta.
sive and useful.

Both appear reasonably inexpen-

The United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit also has an index which it mails periodically
to interested persons.

The committee also notes recent pro-

posals for development of internal indexes in the California
Courts of Appeal.

If adopted, such

should simplify

maintenance of a public index.
Two legal publishers

a computerized legal re-

search service made presentations to the committee and

17/

Appellate counsel, for example, may need to be able to
identi
cases by subject matter and identity of panel
members. Trial judges may need subject matter access
for all areas they handle. Criminal lawyers may need a
detailed fact-laden criminal subject matter index.

18/

In the interests of economy, the committee proposes to
exclude unpublished decisions previously issued from
the ambit of the index.

14

expressed active interest in tackling the index/access problem. A preliminary proposal from one of the publishers
suggests that it might be feasible to offer a commercial index and opinion service on a relatively inexpensive basis.
The comrnittee suggests that this avenue be explored further. 19 1
Finally, the coromittee notes that modest-priced
legal research services have recently become prevalent.
Their advent may decrease the overall costs of researching
unpublished opinions.
Conclusion
The co~mittee recognizes that Californians are
living in a period of limited funding of government services
and that this recoi!1mendation will have to contend with
worthy projects for a share of scarce resources. Nevertheless, in the interests of improving the administration of
justice, the quality of legal practice, the orderly grmvth
and development of this state's decisional law, and operation of the selective publication system itself 1 the committee believes that providing convenient and inexpensive
access to the body of unpublished dec ions is highly
desirable.

19/
--

More detailed comments on the types of storage/retrieval
technology available for legal materials, and a rough
cost estimate of their use with unpublished opinions of
California courts, are found in Appendix B.

15

III.

CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

Pros and Cons of Noncitation
Nowhere is the selective publication debate more
intense than over the associated ban on citation of unpub20
lished opinions. 1 The problem of citation is particularly
intractable in California, where the courts of appeal decide thousands of cases each year, and opinions must be
21
written in all cases. / The
recognizes that permitting citation of all unpublished decisions now would give
institutional litigants an
the

privi

ad van

by reason of

access, and it would impose an impractical

research burden on

s in

of

general inacces-

sibility of the opinions.
On the

hand, the

that full ci

improve tr2

tice and the ef

s of trial and

For

also recognizes
stration of juslate advocacy.

, in criminal cases and other controversial

areas, vindication of the unpopular litigant's position in
the trial court may depend on his counsel's being able to
find and c

an opinion closely in point on the facts as

vlell as the latvi to do so, he must have access to and the
right to cite routine unpublished decisions.
The courts also have an interest in bringing forth
such opinions, trial courts in order to avoid reversal,
appellate courts so as to be spared the need to review and
correct lower court decisions rendered in ignorance of
binding rul

.

And society at large v;ould benefit from

citability in such circumstances, for it would mean less
20/

See, e.g., Carrington, Meador and Rosenberg (1976)
36; Riclliuan and Reynolds, The
PublicatiOn and
-··----:. ~~-,-es Court of ~---- -----1180.

21/

Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14. For a summary of the criticisms that bench, bar and commentators level against
issuing decisions without opinions, see Richman and
Reynolds, supr~, at pp. 1174-1176, and authorities cited.
16

litigation and fewer
23
tional costs. 1

appeals~

and thus lower institu-

Recommendations
In the committee's view, the benefits and costs
of noncitation are so closely balanced that no definitive
policy recommendation is presently appropriate.

The spe-

cific exceptions to noncitation proposed below answer some
objections.

Subject to those exceptions, the committee

recon~ends:

A MODIFIED NONCITATION RULE SHOULD
BE RETAINED FOR THE PP~SENT.
The
of

corr~ittee

further believes, however, that the possibility

loping an inexpensive and convenient index and copy

storage and

scus

above (pp.

8-15} may

Publication of Case Law (1966) 39
-·· ,. written
unreported
value, it is quite likely that
very simi
cases frequently will reappear in the
court~.
Parties will not be aware of prior cases in
point, and even if the litigants are aware, they will
feel
to
fact situations 'Vlhich the courts
have already_cons
• The principle of stare decisis is supposed to preclude the recurrence of similar
fact situations and encourage parties to refrain from
unnecessary litigation.
In short, although fewer cases
will be reported, more cases will come to the appellate
courts."

22/

Cf. Note,
So.Cal.L.

23/

The citation ban decreases the amount of appellate la-v;r
available to guide litigants, attorneys and judges.
From the per
of public administration, there is
reason to fear that this decrease impairs the appellate
courts' ability to enforce compliance with the law by
lower courts and thus contributes to the law explosion.
Courts may be viewed as a specialized form of hierarchical organization, in which appellate courts are
supervisors and trial courts are subordinates. The
literature of administrative hierarchies stresses the
difficulty administrative superiors have in enforcing
their orders among subordinates. Appellate judges are
in an even more difficult supervisory position.
Unlike
bureaucratic bosses, appellate judges cannot initiate
corrective action; they must wait for litigants to
request revie\v. And unlike bureaucratic subordinates,
lower court judges cannot go to their superiors for
advice on how to interpret a given ruling. See Comment,
Courting Reversal: The Supervisorr Role of State
Supreme Courts (1978f 87 Yale L.J. 1191~1I93-ll95.
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bear on the desirability of maintaining the citation ban.
Making unpublished opinions easily accessible may answer
some complaints about noncitation, but it may also remove
the objections to full citation. Therefore, the co~~ittee
recommends:
IF AN INEXPENSIVE, CO~NENIENT ACCESS
SYSTElvi PROVES FEASIBLE, THE POLICY OF NONCITATION SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED.

The committee specifically recommends:
24
RULE 977 SHOULD BE 1VI.cENDED / TO PERHIT
CITATION OF ID~PUBLISHED COURT OF APPEAL
OPINIONS IN CONNECTION WITH PE'l'I'I'IONS FOR
HEARING IN THE SUPREHE COURT, WHENEVER IT
APPEARS 'I'HA'l' l!.N tJNPUBLISHED OPINION CONFLICTS WITH THE CASE IN
REVIEW IS
SOUGH'r; TO PEPJ1IT CITA'l'ION OF UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS OF
DEPARTMENTS OF THE
SUPERIOR COURTS IN THOSE DEPARTHENTS AND
IN THE MUNICIP!>.L Al~D JUS'I'ICE COURTS WITHIN
THE Sl~rvJE COUI\i'J'Y; Al'\JD TO
'l RAT COPIES
OF UNPUBLISHED
INTENDED FOR
TION BE
ADVANCE TO 'I'HE COURT
AND AI... L PAR'I'IES.
1

The
proposal, to permit litigants to call
to the Supreme Court's attention, in petitioning for hearing, the existence of unpublished court of appeal opinions
that conflict with the decision or ruling in which review
is sought (proposed subdivision (a) {1)), would enable the
Supreme Court to fulfill its mandate to eliminate inconsistent
court rulings, 25 / a responsibility that the Court
cannot effectively meet now due to the low visibility of
unpublished decisions. 26 1
The second proposed exception to noncitation is
to permit citation of unpublished opinions of the appellate
departments of the superior courts in those departments and
24/
25/
26/

For text of the proposed rule amendments, see Appendix A.
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29{a).
See
s ci
in n. 13, supra, for examples of
inconsistencies between publishea and unpublished court
of appeal opinions.
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in the municipal and justice courts within their territorial
jurisdiction. This exception the committee considers necessary to remedy an unanticipated adverse effect of the noncitation rule. Most appellate department opinions are unpublished, so the rule wiped out numerous opinions interpreting
local ordinances and rules and those statutes that are applied almost exclusively by the lower courts. This is an
important body of law, since such local authorities and statutory applications are not ordinarily construed by the
higher courts. The municipal and justice courts responsible
for applying statutes locally and enforcing local ordinances
must, the committee believes, be allowed to use the appel-late department opinions that interpret them.
The conuni ttee' s final citation recommendation is
to require that one who plans to cite an unpublished opinion
furnish a copy of the opinion to court
other parties a
in advance of use (proposed subdivision
reasonable
(c))i this enables
and j
to have time to
analyze the opinion. Where an unpublished opinion is cited
in a document, a copy of the opinion is to be appended to
the document. The corr~ittee believes that unpublished opinions
appended to petitions for hearing in the Supreme Court or to
answers thereto, under proposed subdivision (b) (1) of rule 977,
should be excluded from the total number of pages in the petition or answer. Rule 28, subdivision (b) (4) should be amended
to so provide.
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IV.

STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION

Introduction
The committee concludes that full-scale publication
of the more than 6,000 court of appeal opinions produced each
year would be prohibitively costly.

It therefore favors main-

taining selective publication but with modification of the
standards for publication in rule 976.
Witnesses before the corr@ittee documented several
instances of nonuniform application of the current standards,
27
and some committee members have made similar discoveries.
/
Some such inconsistency is inevitable when the standards contain a. signif
fore

subj

element.

The committee there-

s that more objective and precise standards are
In a

required.
used

, a

of the publication standards
28
29
courts 1 and in other states 1 suggests

the

s of opinions merit publication in

that

and effect:ive

sts of sound

the
adminis

of justice.

accordingly

The

recom.mends :
RULE 976 (b) SHOULD BE MiENDED~-Q/ TO PROVIDE POR PUBLICA'l1 ION OF OPINIONS THl\T APPLY
ESTABLISHED RULES OF LAW TO FACTUl'>.L SITUATIONS
SIGNIFICl\NTLY DIFFEH.ENT FROM THOSE IN PUBLISH:t;D
CASES; OPINIONS THAT RESOLVE OR CREATE CONFLICTS
IN THE Ll~Vli OPINIONS IN CASES INVOLVING DIS~
SEN'l'ING OPINIONS OR CONCURRING OPINIONS IN
WHICH REASONS AH.E S'.rATED i OPINIONS THAT REVERSE
ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS BASED ON A RULE
OF Ll\W OR
OF ADMINISTRl'lTIVE RULES;
OPINIONS THAT Ivl.AKE A SIGNIFICAN'l' CONTRIBUTION TO
LEGAL LITERATURE BY UNDER'l'I::.KING HIS'l'ROICAL REVIEW

27/

See references cited in n. 13, supra.

28/
-

For a description and analysis of the federal standards, see, e.g., Note, Unreported Decisions in the
t}~~teg._~t~~~SCOurts __ Aepeals (1977)63 CornellL."Rev.

29/
-

See Chanin 1 A
~2_~nions ~~
(1974) 67 Law

~

Por text of propo

Writinq and Publication of
State App<3llate Courts
-- -375.
rule amendments, see Appendix 1'••

20

OF THE LAW OR DESCRIBING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY; AND
OPINIONS THAT O~HERWISE AID THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.31/
Proposed New Standards
One new standard provides for publication of opinions
that apply established legal rules to substantially new factual
situations (proposed addition to subdivision (b) (1)). The
rationale for this proposal is perhaps best stated by Mr.
Witkin, who has noted that legal practitioners are "constantly on the lookout for applications of old doctrines to
new situations."3 2/ He further observed that "the difference
between an old rule applied to a hovel set of facts and a new
rule devised for such a set of facts is one of degree," and
that courts have difficulty drawing the line. 33/
Like nonaccess generally (see discussion pp. 1619), nonpublication of fact cases of first impression deprives people of necessary guidance on important issues. In
addition, appellate advocacy is impaired, for it relies
largely on argument by analogy, and without publication of
first impression fact cases, many examples of judicial analogical reasoning are inaccessible.
Proposed new subdivision (b) (4) would provide for
publication of opinions that resolve or create conflicts in
the law. This standard is largely a reformulation of the
last sentence of foonote 2 and all of footnote 3 of the
.

~·

~

-

.

31/

The proposed amendments to the standards also incorporate into text the substantive comments now contained in
footnotes to the rules, to the extent they are not affected by the proposals. Substantive legal rules should
not, the committee believes, be relegated to footnote
status.

El

Witkin (1977) Manual on Appellate Court Opinions 30.
Id.
Publication of fact cases of first impression is also
supported by the A.B.A., see American Bar Association
Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration
(1977) Standards Relating to A?pellate Courts, Standard
3.37(b) (1); and by the District of Columbia Circuit.
See District of Columbia Circuit Plan, paragraph e,
reprinted in Spaniol, Report on the Operation of Circuit Opinion Publication Plans-for i977, Appendix~

33/
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present rule. Resolution of real or apparent legal inconsistencies contribute significantly to the administration
of justice, and creation of such conflicts has equally
significant implications. The rules of the federal Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits and of New Jersey
. s1m1
. '1 ar prov1s1ons.~
. .
34 I
conta1n
The committee next recommends publication of all
opinions in cases involving dissenting opinions or concurring opinions in which reasons are stated (proposed subdivision (b) (5)). This standard has the advantage of objectivity, and since dissenting opinions necessarily disagree
with the majority's views of the law, they come close to
qualifying for publication independently, under the existing
standard mandating publication of opinions that criticize
existing law (rule 976, subdivision (b) (3)). This criterion
is also supported by the American Bar Association, 35 / the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice, 36 1 and as to dissents,
the State Bar of California. 37 / And because the number of
unpublished cases involving dissents and concurrences is
relatively small (about 120 in fiscal 1978) ,38 1 the committee's view is that this standard will not substantially add
to the volume of published opinions.
The committee also proposes authorizing publication
of opinions that reverse administrative agency decisions
. based on a rule of law or interpretation of administrative
34/ See Reynolds and Richman, supra, n. 20, at p: 1176 [fed~
-- eral court rules]; State of New Jersey (1974) Standards
for Publication~ Judicial 0Einions, Standard B.7(d).
A.B.A. Commission on Standards of Judicial Admi~istra
tion, Standards Relating to Appellate Courts, supra n.
33, Standard 3.37 {b).
-.JY' National Center for State Courts (1973) Standards for
Publication of Judicial Opinions: Report of the Advisory counc1l on Appellate Justice, Part II, para. 2.
:nl Conference Committee Report on 1974 Conference Resolut1on No. 11-18 (1976) 51 State Bar J. 400, 404.
38/ In fiscal 1978, a total of 151 dissenting opinions and
148 concurring opinions were filed by the courts of appeal. Of these, 64 cases with dissents, 42 cases with
concurrences, and 16 cases with opinions concurring
and dissenting were published. Analysis by members
of the committee.
·

-351
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rules (proposed subdivision (b) (6). Recognizing the
growing importance of administrative agency decisions in
daily life, this standard seeks to insure full compliance
with authoritative judicial rulings that run counter to
prior agency policy.
Opinions that make significant contributions to
legal literature by engaging in historical reviews of the
law or describing legislative history (proposed subdivision
(b) (7)) also merit publication, in the committee's view.
This criterion recognizes the value to the legal community
of publicizing thoroughgoing research and analysis in difficult areas. Researching historical and legislative
materials is particularly difficult and time-consuming, and
provision for publication will make its fruits available to
all. The federal Fourth and Seventh Circuits and the State
. .
39j
o f New Jersey have s1m1lar
ru 1 es.-The final additional standard provides for publication of an opinion that otherwise aids the administration
of justice (proposed subdivision (b) (8)). This residual
category will give the system sufficient flexibility to
permit publication of individual opinions believed to further development of the law, to promote justice, or otherwise to improve the administration of justice. For example,
the committee believes that opinions invoking generally
neglected rules of law or statutes aid the administration
of justice and deserve to be published although they do not
strictly fit within the parameters of present rule 976.

39/

See Chanin, supra n. 29, at pp. 376-379~ State of New
Jersey, Standards for Publication of Judicial O?inions,
supra n. 34, Standard B.7(a), (b).-23

V.

PROCEDURES:

SUPREME COURT DECERTIFICATION
OF PUBLISHED OPINIONS

Current Practice
The committee is of the view that the California
Supreme Court's current use of its power to "decertify"--order
unpublished--court of appeal opinions is undesirable and
should be brought to an end.

It is understandable that the

Supreme Court may on occasion differ with a court of appeal
panel as to the extent to which a particular opinion falls
within the standards for publication in rule 976(b).

Never-

theless, empirical evidence and analysis suggest that in
fact the Supreme Court decertifies. court of appeal opinions
that are within the publication criteria, particularly by
virtue of their novelty (rule 976(b} (1)) or their cricitism
of existing law (rule 976(b) (3)). 401 Mr. Witkin hit the mark
squarely when he charged that in reality the Supreme Court's
practice of decertification has become a "distinct form of
41
[substantive] reviev.1." 1 Indeed, Mr. Witkin's criticism
finds support in statements of the Supreme Court itself,

.!Q/

.1Y
..!_4/

42

1

See, ~.' Comment, Decertification of Appellate Opinions: The Need for Articulated Judicial Reasoning and
certain-precedent 1n Californ1a Law (1977) 50 So.car:L.Rev. 1181, 1188-11890 n. 40 [collecting decertified
opinions appearing to "come within the parameters of
rule 976 11 ] •
Witkin (1977) Manual on Appellate Court Opinions
22, p. 35 •

§

Of particular interest is a letter from the Supreme
Court addressed to Ms. Mary K. Gillespie, dated May 14,
1975, regarding Chaffin v. Chaffin [sic] 2 Civ. 43862
[opn. pub'd. sub. nom. Chaffin v. Frye {1975) 45 Cal.
App.3d 39], rejecting her request for decertification
on the following grounds:
A petition for hearing was filed and
received by this court. That petition was
denied. You are now, in effect, asking the
court to shape the constitutional law by
suppressing publication of an opinion.
It
appears that to so act would be law by elimination rather than by elucidation.
A copy of the letter is on file with the committee.
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while the former Chief Justice has candidly acknowledged this
use of decertification:
The • • • opinions ordered to be nonpublished are those in which the correct result
has been reached by the Court of Appeal but
the opinion contains language which is an erroneous statement of the law and if left on
the books would not only disturb the pattern
of the law but would be likely to mislead
judges, attorneys and other interested officials.
If such an opinion appears • . • , [w]e
can grant the petition for hearing for the purpose of writing an opinion which would reach
the same result but which would eliminate the
erroneous language or rule. . • • The other
course open to us is to order the opinion to
be nonpublished and thus eliminate possible
confusion by members of the bench and bar.43j
Restoring the Integrity of the Svstem
The committee is concerned to protect the integrity of rule 976 and to discourage its use as a mechanism
for substantive review by the Supreme Court.

Accordingly,

it recommends:
44
RULE 976, SUBDIVISION (c) SHOULD BE AMENDED /
TO PROVIDE 'l'HAT IN EXERCISING ITS PmvER TO ORDER
OPINIONS PUBLISHED OR NOT PUBLISHED, THE SUPRE.HE
COURT SHALL OBSER\r'E THE STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION
SPECIFIED IN SUBDIVISION (b).
The committee recognizes that adoption of the
suggested amendment would exacerbate the Supreme Court's
workload problem by removing a method for dealing expeditiously with court of appeal opinions that in terms of
outcome appear correct, and thus do not warrant a plenary
grant of hearing, yet contain what the Supreme Court considers erroneous or improvident language likely to cause
problems in future litigation.
co~~ittee

To handle such cases, the

recommends:

.

THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVIVE ITS
43/

Letter from retired Chief Justice Donald Wright to author of Comment, Decertification of Appellate Opinions,
supra n. 40 reproduced 1d. at 1189 n. 20,.24.

!Y

For text of the proposed rule amendments, see Appendix A.
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FORMER PRACTICE OF WITHHOLDING APPROVAL FROM
ERRONEOUS PORTIONS OF COURT OF APPEAL OPINIONS
ON DENIAL OF HEARINGS.45/
This can be accomplished either by the Supreme
Court's reviving the practice on its own initiative, or by
adoption of a new subdivision to rule 29~specifying that on
denial of hearing of a published court of appeal opinion,
the Supreme Court may expressly withhold its approval or
otherwise comment on parts of the opinion, and that its comments are to be published in conjunction with the opinion.
Finally, the coiil!'Tiittee considers "substantive" use
of decertification to :b::= symptontatic of the Supreme Court's dif47
ficulty in handling its rapidly growing caseload / with inflexible hearing and review procedures. It believes that
the preferred long-term solution to this problem would be to
do away with the current procedure by which the Supreme Court,
on granting hearing, automatically transfers t.he entire cause to itself for a de novo appellate hearing on the entire record and all
issues, and vacates the court of appeal opinion, treating it
as though it never existed.~ The Supreme Court's "takeover"
procedure, should, the committee believes, :b::= brought into line
with the nationally prevailinq l)ractice""' whereby a court of last
resort revie\vs the decisions of intermediate appellate
courts rather than of the trial courts and deals with only
.
. .
.
49/
those 1ssues requ1r1ng revlew.-For a description and defense of the former practice,
see 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal,
§ 622, p. 4544.
4.6/ For text of the proposed rule amendment, see Appendix A.

ii?

..

47 I

!V
49/

.

.

The growth is dramatized by comparing statistics for
1965-1966 with 1976-1977. During the 1965-1966 fiscal
year, the Supreme Court received 1,205 petitions for
hearing and granted 127. During 1976-1977, these figures had increased to 2,927 (up 143%) and 231 (up
82%), respectively. Judicial Council (1978) Annual
Report, Tab~e IV, p. 64.
see 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971} Appeal,
§ 617, p. 4540.
See, e.g., Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, rule
39, Review of Decisions of Courts of Appeal, specifying
that Alabama Supreme Court review of intermediate court
opinions is by writ of certiorari adpressed to specific
questions or to classes of cases •
.26

Such a change would lighten the Supreme Court's
workload by empowering it to focus on specific issues warranting its attention rather than dealing with entire cases,
some aspects of which may have been correctly decided by the
court of appeal.
Retention of Court of Appeal 0Einions on Grant of Hearing
To make this system work, the committee further
recommends:
50/
RULE 976(d) SHOULD BE AMENDED-- TO REMOVE THE
Ll~NGUAGE THAT ~mNDATES NONPUBLICATION FOR COURT
OF APPEAL OPINIONS IN CASES IN WHICH THE SUPREME
COURT GRANTS REVIEW.51/
Mechanically, the notation of grant of hearing
would appear at the end of the court of appeal opinion,
the way denial of hearing now does. Should the case be
50/ For text of the proposed rule amendment, see Appendix A.
51/ It is generally believed that the de novo plenary take-over procedure and automatic deletion of court of appeal opinions are constitutionally required under the
"transfer" language now.in article VI, section 12, which
provides in pertinent par'c "The Supreme Court may, before decision becomes final, transfer to itself a cause
in a Court of Appeal." {See 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d
ed. 1971) Appeal, § 617.) The cases do not entirely
support this view. One line holds that the order
granting a hearing empowers the Supreme Court to decide
all issues.
(E.g., Menchaca v. Helms Bakeries, Inc.
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 535, 541, n. 1; Martin v. Howe (1922)
190 Cal. 187, 188.) Another holds that by reason of the
grant of hearing, court of appeal opinions "become a
nullity and are of no force and effect, either as a
judgment or as an authoritative statement of any principle of la'Vl therein discussed." (E.g. , Knouse v.
Nimocks (1937) 8 Cal.2d 482, 483-484.) The first
proposition is not necessarily inconsistent with selective grant of hearing, for the Supreme Court may
choose to exercise less than its full review power;
nothing requires it to address all issues. Thus, no
constitutional amendment would appear necessary to
accomplish selective review.
(See Chilton, AEEellate
Court Reform: The Premature ScalEel (1973) 48 State
Bar J. 393, 467:T The rule that grant of hearing supersedes the court of appeal opinion is more difficult
to work around, but it is exclusively a rule of interpretation, for nothing in the constitutional text states
that nullification of the entire court of appeal opinion is a necessary consequence of a.Supreme Court grant
of hearing.
27

reversed, that would be noted in Shepard's Citations, as
is the practice in most jurisdictions.
The committee is mindful that retention of court
of appeal opinions after transfer to the Supreme Court would
depart from past practice, as noted in one of the minority
reports. The mere existence of change, however, is not conside red an unanswerable argument against accomplishing it.
The committee believes that maximum information
and exposure is the road to maximum good; every other AngloAmerican jurisdiction with a multitiered appellate structure
exposes to permanent public view the reports of the entire
progress of an appeal, rather than pretending that a major
portion of that process never occurred. Under any circumstances, the committee believes there would be benefit for
both the public and the judiciary in increasing awareness of
the interaction between our courts of appeal and Supreme
Court. The court of appeal opinions in question by definition qualify for publication, and they therefore are especially carefully drafted and well-reasoned and of interest to
attorneys and scholars. One cannot help noting that these
intermediate Of?inions are already published, in the advance
sheets of the official reports, ru1d in the advance sheets and
bound volumes of the West Publishing Company's California Reporter. To express concern over "subscribers [who] pay for
many pages of [superseded] decisions1 is unrealistic; at
present, the only difference is vlhich set of reports a particular subscriber takes--and preference between commercial
suppliers does not appear a valid distinction.
Finally, the present system is uneconomical, for
it forces the Supreme Court to duplicate the court of appeal's efforts for parts of opinions that are correctly
decided and adequately expressed. Indeed the Supreme Court
occasionally refers to co~rect.court of appeal rulings,
apparently neglecting to recognize that with the current
system there is no longer any court of appeal opinion to
52/
refer to.---See, e.g., People v. Hidalgo (1978) 22 Cal.3d 826, S28;
"Defendant's attacks upon the revocation proceeding
were fully considerd by the Court of Appeal and we agree
they lack merit."]

W
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VI.

PROCEDURES: INITIAL PUBLICATION DECISION
REQUESTS FOR PUBLICATION

The committee proposes the following changes in
the procedure for initial publication of appellate opinions.
The initial publication decision would still be made by the
panel that decides the case, but the cownittee recommends:
RULE 976(b) SHOULD BE AMENDED 53 / TO
REMOVE THE PRESENT PRESUMPTION AGAINST
PUBLICATION.
The co~~ittee believesthat as the standards necessarily involve subjective judgments, a more neutral approach
will produce greater consistency in their application. The
committee also notes that the ne\V' standard requiring publication of dissents and reasoned concurrences (proposed rule
976(b) (5)) is quite objective, so that publication under it
should be automatic.
~·he committee believes that fair and efficient operation of the procedure for requesting publication is currently severely hampered by limited and unequal access 54 / and
would benefit significantly from adoption of the unpublished
opinion index-access system proposed earlier in this report
(see p. 8).
At present, it is practically impossible for
most people to obtain copies of opinions, particularly within
the time limits for requesting publication, and persons with
access may request publication only of opinions favorable
to them. Adoption of the coromittee's recommendations regarding opinion access will significantly improve the fairness and efficiency of the requesting procedure.
Witnesses before the committee found fault with
access and with other aspects of the request procedure.
53/
54/
--

For text of the proposed rule amendment, see Appendix A.
That unequal availability of unpublished opinions gives
institutional and habitual litigants an unfair advantage
under the request procedure has been noted in other jurisdictions as well. See, e.g., Reynolds and Richman,
The Non-Precedential Precedent--Limited Publication and
N0n-C1tat1on Rules 1n the Un1ted States Courts of Aopeals
(1978) 78 Colum.L.Rev.-rf67, 1179.
-- •
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Requests are sometimes not acted upon promptly, and requesters sometimes are not informed of their disposition by
the courts of appeal. The committee therefore recommends:
RULE 978(a) SHOULD BE AMENDED 55 / TO
REQUIRE THE COURT OF APPEAL TO SEND A COPY
OF ITS RECOW·ffiNDATION AND STATEMENT OF REASONS
REGARDING A REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION TO ALL
PARTIES AND TO ANY OTHER PERSON vlHO HAS REQUESTED PUBLICATION. RULE 976(b) SHOULD BE
N1ENDED TO PROVIDE THAT THE SUPREME COURT SHALL
DISPOSE OF REQUESTS FOR PUBLICATION PROMPTLY
AND THAT EACH PARTY TO THE ACTION AND ANY
OTHER PERSON vlHO HAS REQUESTED PUBLICATION
SHALL BE NOTIFIED OF THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE
SUPREME COURT.
Some committee witnesses also complained that requests for publication are not handled systematically by
court clerks* The committee accordingly further recommends:
FILING SYSTEMS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IN
COURT CLEP~S' OFFICES TO INSURE PROPER
HP~JDLING OF REQUESTS FOR PUBLICATION.

55/

For text of the proposed rule amendment, see Appendix A.
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VII.

PARTIAL PUBLICATION

Partial publication is the practice of publishing
part but not all of an opinion under a selective publication
scheme; it would be used when only part of an opinion meets
the criteria for publication, and only that portion would be
published.

Although not authorized by rule 976 or in use in

any United States courts at present, partial publication
enjoys support among judges and commentators.
before the

con~ittee

Witnesses

favored it, some 40 Court of Appeal

justices at a 1974 workshop sponsored by the Judicial Council unanimously approved the idea, the Chief Justice's Special Committee on Appellate Practices and Procedures recommends it, and opinions from nearly every district have
.
SG/
lamented 1ts
unava1'1 a b'l'
1 lty.-Legal authors 5 .I/ and the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice have also recommended partial publication. 58 /
56/

See Golden Gate Bridge Dist. v. Muzzi {1978) 83 Cal.
App.3d 707, 714 [First District, Third Division];
People v. Collins (1975) 44 Ca1.App.3d 617, 623 [Third
District]: People v. Johnson (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 183,
189 [Fourth District, Second Division]; People v. Superior Court (Hulbert) (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 497, 414415 [Fourth District, Second Division]; People v. Muse
(1978) 5 Crim. 2884 [unpublished decision of Fifth District; author prepared a "fictitious" published opinion
for the one issue warranting publication; copy on file
with committee]. See also People v. Moore (1971) 15
Cal.App.3d 851 [Second District, Division II], an actua-l opinion that is partially published. For an example of a wholly published opinion that, according
to its author, contains unpublishable material, see
Meyser v. American Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. {1978) 85
Cal.App.3d 933; the "unpublishable" part runs from
p. 938 through p. 941.

;ul

E.g., Witkin (1977) Manual on Appellate Court Opinions § 23, p. 37; Goodwin, Partial Publication: A Prol?osal for a Change.~ the ~'Packa~in9: 11 of Californi"a-Court of Appeal Op1n1ons to Prov1de More Useful Informatlon for the Consumer (1979) 19 Santa Clara L.Rev. 53.

-----

.s_e/

.

Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions, Part ·xi,
section II, paragraph 4, reprinted in part in Leflar
(1974) Appellate Judicial Opinions 318.
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However, the State Bar Conference Committee on Publication
of Opinions in 1976 voted against the idea. 59 /
Claimed Advantages and Committee Uncertainties
Supporters of partial publication contend that it
is needed to deal properly with opinions that contain both
publishable and unpublishable material, opinions which must
now be either published in full--adding needless pages to
the reports--or not published--depriving bench, bar and
academy of useful judicial rulings.

The committee, however,

is uncertain as to the overall impact of partial publication.

Its use would seem to require more discriminating

application of the publication criteria than the present system, and this may not be possible given the vagueness and
subjectivity of the standards.

Upon reviewing the above-

cited opinions that separated out "unpublishable" materials,
some committee members found that the "unpublishable" sections in fact sometimes met the standards for publication.
Also, some members, noting that all but one of the abovecited cases involved criminal law, expressed concern that
partial publication will further reduce the number of published criminal rulings, to the prejudice of defendants.
A second area of committee uncertainty involves
the appropriate mechanics of partial publication.

Should

the published part of an opinion summarize omitted material
or simply indicate deletions?

The former system vmuld pre-

serve overall case contents, which may be important in criminal cases, particularly where prejudicial error is at issue; the latter would save space and perhaps time.

Should

citation be permitted to unpublished or summarized portions
of partially published opinions? Should summarized parts beindexed/digested? How should Shepard's Citations handle partiaLly
published opinions where, e.g., a case is reversed on an unpublished point?

Should it be possible to request publica-

tion of parts of unpublished opinions?
59!

If so, how should

Conference Co~nittee Report on 1974 Conference Resolution No. 11-18 (1976} 51 State Bar J. 400, 404.
The California Academy of Appellate Lawyers supported
the Conference Corr~ittee Report. Letter of August 22,
1976 from Ellis Horvitz to Robert .S~ligson, copy on
file with committee.
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deletions or summaries be prepared in such cases, and by
whom? And should such a rule be made retroactive?
In any event, selecting and drafting factual and
legal material so as to make a partially published opinion
both accurate and intelligible in itself also appears to be
a delicate problem. 60 1 Perhaps, absent judicial experience,
appropriate approaches can be discovered in legal casebooks,
which routinely must face comparable problems in excerpting
appellate opinions for use by law students and professors.
Recommendation
In sum, the committee is aware that partial publication enjoys substantial support. The committee is,
however, concerned at the number and gravity of the unanswered questions in the realms of both policy and practical
implementation. For this reason, the committee recommends:
PROPOSALS FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION OF
OPINIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN FURTHER STUDY, INCLUDING DEVELOP¥1ENT AND CARRYING OUT OF
PILOT PROJECTS TO 'l'EST AND EVALUATE THEivi
IN PRJ'>,CTICE.

60/

See Smith, The Selective Publication of Opinions: One
Court's Experience (1978) 32 Ark.L.ReV':" 26, 28 ("The
Arkansas rule omits a provision of the model rule permitting only a part of an opinion to be published, the
[Arkansas Supreme] Court's thought being that the occasional usefulness of partial publication would be
more than offset by the difficulties inherent in any
attempt to write an opinion intended for dissection").
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The present wide disparity in publication rates between the various divisions of the Courts of Appeal establishes
rather conclusively that the present standards are not being
applied uniformly.
is manifest.

The desirability of more objective standards

HOivever, the creation of an arbitrary standard

which has no relevance to the precedential value of the case
is no ansv;er.

Therefore, I must part company \'lith the rest of

the committee in its recommendation that all cases in which a
concurring or dissenting opinion with reasons given be published.
vfuile I lean to the school of thought that the major
vice under present publication practices is overpublication
rather than underpublication, I have, with some reservations,
gone along with the

reco~~endations

of the committee as to most

of the suggestions for amendments to Rule 976b.

Frankly, I

think most of them are rather more cosmetic than substantive
and I seriously doubt that they will change present publication
practices.

However, if these changes will make the critics of

the present situation happy, I have little hesitation in
joining with the majority as to most of these

reco~~endations.

However, I must part company with the committee in its
recommendation b-4 that all cases be published in which a
dissenting or concurring opinion in which reasons are stated be
published.

In an effort to establish objective standards, I
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submit that the committee has recommended an arbitrary
standard which has no relationship to the ultimate goal, i.e.,
the publication of appropriate opinions and the nonpublication
of inappropriate opinions.
The idea that an opinion with a dissent somehow has
gained precedential value is simply wrong.

The five, free-

thinking, independent-minded justices of my own court dissent
regularly, vigorously and enthusiastically and often as not
in cases of absolutely no precedential value.

The bare fact

of a dissent does not elevate the case to the status of a
publishable opinion.

Most dissents arise from a difference

of opinion as to the exercise of discretion on the part of
the trial court, whether substantial evidence supports a
judgment or order, or whether an error is of prejudicial
proportion.

Publication of these opinions will merely clutter

up the books and will add nothing to the corpus of the law.
These are judgment calls, pure and simple.
The idea of publishing all cases in which concurring
opinions are filed is even worse.

A concurring opinion merely

means that one member of the panel agrees with·the result but
not with the analysis of the majorityj or one justice may take
issue with some of the language of the majority, or one justice
may choose to reach the same result via another analysis.

None

of these have anything to do with the value of the case as
precedent.
Additionally, this rule would open the door to an abuse
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of the system.

It will allow the author of the opinion, rather

than the court, to make the decision re publication by the simple
expedient of filing a concurring opinion with his own majority
opinion.

This committee very properly rejected the concept

that the author of the opinion be the sole judge as to publication.

Any reader of the Advance Sheets must be quite aware

that a very large number of published opinions are authored by
a rather limited number of justices.

Somehow these justices

seem to find specks of gold in each of their opinions which
specks of gold the rest of us are too obtuse to discover in
our own opinions.

The only restriction on these over-enthusiastic

authors is the fact that the decision as to whether to publish
is a court decision and not that of the individual.

Thus, it

is possible to circumvent this safety valve by the simple expedient of writing a concurring opinion to go with one's
1/

majority opinion.-

I am not nit-picking.

Out of 5,959 majority opinions

filed in the fiscal year 1977-1978, 297 fell into this category, 146 with concurring opinions and 151 with dissenting
opinions.

Since the average

vollli~e

of Cal.App. 3d contains about

1/ In this respect, I am indebted to fellow co~~ittee
member,-Gideon Kanner, for the pr!celess case of Alevizos
v. Metrooolitan Airport Conmission, etc., 216 lHl 2d 651, 666,
where the author of the majority opinion dissented in part
from his own handiwork.
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200 opinions, we are talking about a volume and a half' of

opinions.

I'll admit that of the above .figures, some

are already being published but when I see that almost
300 opinions are going to experience instant publication
regardless of merit, I am disturbed.
Therefore, I must respectf'ully dissent from that
portion of the committee report which recomnends that opinions
containing dissents or concurrences

wit~

reasons stated be

published.
Actually, the inability of those of us on the Courts
of Appeal to police ourselves persuades me that some agency
or entity other than the court writing the opinion should
make the decision regarding publication.

However, when this

idea was presented to the comnittee, it failed dismally.
Nevertheless, if the present abuse of both overpublication
and underpublication continues, something of this nature looms
in our .future.

DATED:

May 15, 1979
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

ROBERT GARDNER
CHARLES M. SEVILLA
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MINORITY REPORT ON THE NON-CITABILITY RULE

The undersigned members of the committee endorse
the affirmative recommendations of the majority report
and (with the exception to be noted)

join in the majority's

decision to refrain from recommending other action.

In

particular, we are greatly encouraged by the recommendation
that steps be taken to devise and effectuate practical means
of access to the body of unpublished decisions of Courts of
Appeal, including exploration of contemporary technology
and alternate media for disseminating the contents of such
decisions.

The latter is a realistic and principled step

toward public accountability for judicial product and

res~~ct

for the time-honored function of stare decisis.
However, we cannot subscribe to the majority's
failure to come to grips with the irrationalities, illogic
and (we believe) constitutional infirmities of continued
adherence to the ban which Rule 977 imposes on citing certain
decided cases.

We believe that courts make law by what they

say and do, and not just by the form of expression they choose.
Consequently, we believe it unsound to act as if certain
judicial action did not occur, when manifestly it did.
The Committee heard no defense of a ban on citation
in terms of either principle or philosophy; even those who
advocate retention of the practice admit they cannot justify
it on such grounds.

We are told, however, that it must be
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retained for reasons of sheer expediency from either
(or both) of two standpoints:

(1) the "system" will simply

"choke itself" if litigants are allowed freedom to tell
courts what other courts have done;

(2) allowing reference

to previous decisions not contained in the official reports
will give some lawyers an "unfair advantage" over others.
We are not persuaded.

Vivid characterization is

simply not an argument, nor do we see the judicial process
as a game in which handicapping is necessary to insure that
each player has an equal chance at winning.

It is entirely

possible that denying the existence of immutable fact does
make life easier for some lawyers, but we doubt that is an
acceptable rationale.

If there is any area of our body

politic in which expedience should not be exalted over
principle, we believe it to be the judicial process.
We cannot condone the anomaly inherent in depriving
generations of litigants who would be affected, the benefit
of pertinent prior decisions, and then exhorting the
goodness inherent in providing access to them.
Specifically, there are two fundamental problems
with the majority's endorsement of perpetuation of the
non-citability rule.
First, the majority appears oblivious to the fact
that it simply cuts across the grain of the sense of fairness
of a principled society that a litigant who is before a
court and who desires to be treated by that court in the
same way that other, similarly situated litigants have been
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treated in the past, is commanded to keep quiet instead.

No

degree of expediency, or administrative convenience, or
supposed "unfairness", can outweigh the preceding
consideration.
Second, the discussions ·of the majority completely
ignore the Constitutional aspects of the problem, of which
there are two:

1.

Equal protection and due process
problems inherent in non-citation
would appear obvious.

2.

In addition, First Amendment problems
are involved.

Aside from possible

freedom of speech aspects, we refer
to the provisions of the First
Amendment which guarantee the right
to petition the government for redress
of grievances.

If the grievance on

which relief is sought is a petitioner's
claim that the law is not being
uniformly applied in the courts, because
there is a lack of even-handedness in
the treatment of himself and other
classes of litigants, he is deprived of
an effective opportunity to do so.
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In connection with the latter point, it was
disturbing to hear some of the testimony presented to the
Committee that there seems to be a claimed pattern of
unevenness in the publication of opinions in criminal
prosecutions involving sex related activities.

We are not

able, nor do we seek to verify or dispute the accuracy of
such charges.

Our point is that, as long as such charges

are made, there ought to be a ready means of verifying their
merits or lack thereof in cases where they are made and in
which a litigant feels aggrieved.
Permitting parties making such charges to cite
pertinent unpublished opinions, would seem to be an
appropriate way of dispelling the doubts otherwise cast on
the administration of justice.
The majority, of course, recognizes some of these
problems implicitly, because it recommends an exception to
the non-citability rule to permit citation of unpublished
opinions in support of petitions for hearing in the Supreme
Court.

This exception provides relief to aggrieved litigants

only before the one Court that is not required to listen to
them; i.e., before the Supreme Court, which has full
discretion to deny hearing.

Meanwhile, opportunity to make

the same argument, and correct the same flaw in the law
before the courts that must hear any aggrieved litigant, and
presumably must resolve the issue presented by him (in the
case of the Court of Appeal, "in writing with reasons stated"),
is simply denied.
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Finally, we commend to the majority its own
exhortation of the benefits to be derived from access to the
body of unpublished decisional law.

If judges, lawyers, and

scholars are to have access to this material, and this access
is to be the source of the benefits so highly thought of by
the majority, then we are at a loss to understand why this
same benefit should not be available to the courts and the
litigants when they most need it:

in the midst of litigation

that gives rise to an issue precisely the same as that
decided in other [unpublished] cases.
Therefore, we would recommend repeal of Rule 977
and (1) substitution of a rule requiring adequate advance
notice of an intent to rely upon an unpublished opinion,
together

wi~h

supplying of a copy thereof to all affected;

and (2) a request to the State Bar that it recommend to the
Supreme Court a Rule of Professional Conduct articulating
the duty of attorneys aware of unfavorable (or potentially
unfavorable) unpublished opinions to disclose such cases to
the tribunal, along with the favorable ones.
Only in this way will there be an effective
mechanism for the correction of unintentional lapses or
intentional abuses of the non-publication process.

DATED:

May 15, 1979
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

EDWARD L. LASCHER
GIDEON KANNER
MICHAEL M. BERGER
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Chief Justice's Advisory Committee
For an Effective

Publication Rule

1'finority Report
In Oppo.sJtion to the Advisory Committee's
Recommendation Relative to Subdivision (d)
of rule 976 of the California Rules of
Court.
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Minority Report
Relative to Proposed Subdivision (d) of Rule 976

The Advisory Committee for an Effective Publication
Rule recommends the addition of subdivision (d) to rule 976
of the California Rules of Court to provide that:
seeee opinions Effect of grant of hearing]
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Published Court

of Appeal opinions in cases in which the Supreme Court grants
a hearing shall remain published in the Official Reports, and
a notation of grant of hearing shall immediately follow such
opinions."
It is felt that the foregoing proposed subdivision
calling for the retention of Court of Appeal opinions in the
Official Reports following the granting of hearingsis inconsistent with the judicially declared status of such opinions
as nonentities and is otherwise counterproductive as hereafter
noted.

The subdivision therefore ought not to be adopted.
Background and Reasoning:
By 1903 the judicial business of California had grown

to such a degree that the Supreme Court no longer could handle
the load.

Accordingly, in 1904 the Constitution was amended

to provide for District Courts of Appeal and for Supreme Court
review of the new district courts' decisions.

Ail:\

(Then Cal. Const.,

art.VI, § 4.)

The applicable clause provided:

"The supreme

'

court shall have power

m order any cause pending before the

supreme court to be heard and determined by a district court
of appeal, and to order any cause pending before a district
court of appeal to be heard and determined by the supreme
court.

The order last mentioned may be made before judgment

has been pronounced by a district court of appeal, or within
thirty days after such judgment shall have become final therein.

The judgments of district courts of appeal shall become

final upon expiration of thirty days after the same shall have
been pronounced."
The purpose of granting the Supreme Court the power
of transfer after decision in the district courts (now Courts
of Appeal) was "'to secure harmony and uniformity in the decisions, their conformity to the settled rules and principles
of law, a uniform decision throughout the state, a correct and
uniform construction of the constitution, statutes and charters,
and, in some instances, a final decision by the court of last
resort of some doubtful or disputed question of law.'"

(In re

Wells (1917) 174 Cal. 467, 472.)
By virtue of the foregoing constitutional provision
substantively carried forward to present article VI, section
12, the Supreme Court was given power· to vacate a district
court decision and order the cause transferred to its own calendar for argument and fresh decision.
at pp. 472-473.)

(In re Wells, supra,

Over the years the Supreme Court has con-

sistently spelled out the effect of such a transfer.
summarizes the court's position to be:
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Witkin

"The case is then

'at large,' i.e., to be decided on the entire record and all
the issues, as if originally appealed to the Supreme Court,
regardless of the ground relied upon in granting the hearing."
(6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1971 ed.) Appeal, § 617, p. 4540.)
In Knouse v. Nimocks (1937) 8 Cal.2d- 482, 483, the Supreme
Court held: "The opinion and decision

e

•

*

by our order of

transfer, have become a nullity and are of no force or effect
either as a judgment or as an authoritative statement of any
principle of law therein discussed."

A more recent affirma-

tion of this holding appears in Menchaca v. Helms Bakeries,

.!!!.£.

(1968) 68 Cal.2d 535, 541, footnote 1:

"Although plain-

tiffs did not raise the issue of negligent equipage in their
petition for hearing, the question was briefed by both parties
and may be reviewed by this court.

An order granting a peti-

tion for hearing transfers the entire cause here [citations],
and the case is then to be decided on all issues, as if originally appealed to this court, regardless of the grounds relied
on in the petition.

[Citations omitted.]"

Given the foregoing background and the repeated
rulings of the Supreme Court that the cause is at large in all
respects upon transfer, it becomes clear that the significance
of the lower court's decision is reduced to the point that it
is unworthy of publication in the Official Reports.

To publish

the opinion under these circumstances is to encourage pure
"speculation" as to the reason or reasons why the Supreme Court
granted the hearing.

The Supreme Court may reach issues not

even raised in the petition for hearing.

47

(Menchaca v. Helms

Bakeries, Inc., supra, 68 Cal.2d 535, 541.) The Supreme Court may
adopt the decision of the Court of Appeal verbatim, reverse it
partially or in whole, or affirm it on radically different theories.

To encourage speculation by publishing such superseded de-

cisions is counterproductive and opposed to the Supreme Court's
clear holding relative to the judicial worth of such decisions.
Until the court retreats from its holding on the subject, publication appears to be inappropriate.

In £act, prriceeding with

the publication of such decisions automatically violates the
standards of publication that the committee recommends should
control publication and guaranties the publication of the unworthy opinion.
Add~.tionally,

to continue such opinions in the Official

Reports will require subscribers to pay for many pages of decisions that possess no vitality either now or for· the future.
· In view of the foregoing background and considerations
it is respectfully suggested that the corrilldttee's recommendation relative to the adoption of subdivision (d) of new proposed
rule 976 not be followed.

DATED:

May 15, 1979
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

ROBERT E. FORHICHI
ELLIS J. HORVITZ
LEONARD SACKS
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APPENDIX A
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT
Rule 976.

Publication of appellate opinions

(a) * * *
(b)
[Standards for opinions of other courts] No An
opinion of a Court of Appeal or of an appellate department
of the superior court shall be published in the Official
Reports ~ft~e~~ if such opinion: {1) establishes a new rule
of _laws applies an established rule or prinaiple to a faatual
situation substantially different from that in published aasess
or alters or modifies an existing rule,± (2) involves a legal
issue of continuing public interest~ to a substantial group of
the publia suah as publia offiaerss agenaies or entities, members of an eaonomia alass, or a business or professional
3 (4) resolves or
groz:,ps or (3) criticizes existing law,,
creates an apparent aonfliat in the laws (5) is a partial or
complete dissenting opinion, oP a aonaurring opinion in
whiah ~easons are stated, or is aaaompanied by suah an
opinion, (6) aonstitutes a reversal of an administrative
~f

-

~f

-

3f
-

~his er~eerien ea±~~

fer ~~e±ieaeien e£ the relatively
£ew e~iniens that e~tab±i~h new rtlies e£ law, ine±tld~n~
a new eenstrtletion o£ a stat~te, or that ehan~e existin~
r~±es.
~his eriterien does net ;~sti£y ~ttb±ieat~en o£ a
£aet ease e£ £irst im~ressien, where a ±e~a± ra±e er
~rineip±e is applied to a sabstantia±±y new £aetaa±
sitttatien.
~his

eriterien re~~ires that the ±e~a± isstle7 rather than
the ease or eentreversy, be e£ p~b±ie interest and that
the interest be e£ a eentinain~ natare and net merely
transitory. Pttb~ie interest mast be distin~aished £rem
~ttb~ie etiriosity.
~he re~tiirement e£ ~tlb±ie interest may
be satis£ied i£ the ie~a± issae is o£ eentinaing interest
to a Stibstantia~ ~rotlp o£ the ~ah~ie saeh as ~ab~ie e££ieers, a~eneies or entities, members e£ an eeenemie e~ass7
er a basiness or ~re£essiena~ ~roti~• An e~inion whieh
e±ari£ies a eontro~iin9 rti~e o£ ~aw that is net we±± eseab~ished or e±ear~y statea in p~ier ~e~erted o~iniens,
whieh reeonei~es een£~ieting ~ines o£ a~therity, or whieh
tests the ~resent va~ioity e£ a sett~ed prineipie in the
!i9ht o£ modern atttherities e~sewhere may be ~~b±ished ander this eriterien i£ it satisfies the re~airement that
the ~e~a! iesae ~e o£ eentinain~ ~ttb~ie interest.
~his eriterion wea~d ;asti£y ~tlb~ieatien e£ the rare intermediate a~~e!!ate opinion whieh £inds £ati~t with existin~
eommen ~aw er statntory ~rinei~~es and deetrines and whieh
reeommends ehan~es ~y a hi~her eeart or ~y the be~is~at~re~
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agency decision based on a rule of law or interpretation of
administrative rules, (7) constitutes a significant and
nondupliaative contribution to legal literature either by a
historical review of the law or by describing the legislative history of a statute or ordinance, or (8) otherwise
aids the administration of justice.
(c)
[Publication procedure]
(1)

[Courts of Appeal and appellate departments]
Bft~ess etherw~se di~eeted by the Stl~reme 6etl~t, a An opinion
of a Court of Appeal or of an appellate department of the
superior court shall be published in the Official Reports if
a majority of the court rendering the opinion certifies,
prior to the decision becoming final in that court, that it
meets one or more of the standards specified in subdivision
(b). An e~~n~en net so ee~t~£~ed sha%± neve~the±ess
he

~tlh±~shed ~n

Stt~reme

eott~t

the

e££~e~a± Re~orts tl~on o~der

o£ the

te that e££eet.

(2)
[Supreme Court] Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an
opinion certified for publication shall not be published in
the Official Reports, and an opinion not so certified shall
be published in the Official Reports, upon an order of the
Supreme Court to such effect. In exercising its power to
order opinions published or not published, the Supreme Court
shall observe the standards for publication specified in
subdivision (b) of this rule.
(d)
[Stt~erseded o~~n~ens Effect of grant of hearing]
Regardless o£ the foregoing
no

e~in~en stt~erseded

er ether

jttd~eia±

by the

aet~en

~rov~siens
grant~n9

sha±± be

e£ this rtt±e,
o£ a

~ttb%~shee

fiear~n97 rehear~ng

in the

8££~-

Published Court of Appeal opinions in oases
in which the Supreme Court grants a hearing shall remain
published in the Official Reports, and a notation of grant
of hearing shall immediately follow suah opinions.

e~a±

Re~erts.

(e)

* * *

so

Rule 977.
(a)

Citation of unpublished opinions prohibited;
exceptions
[General. ruZ.e]

An opinion e£ a ee~rt: e£ A~~ea:l:

er e£ aft a~~e:l:lat:e ae~aremeftt: e£ a ~~~erier ee~rt tnat
is not published, certified for pubZ.ication, or ordered pub:t

Z.ished in the Official Reports pursuant to ruZ.e 976 shall
not be cited by a court or by a party in any other action or
proceeding except wneft t:ne e~~n~eft ~s re:l:evaftt ~naer
t:ne

deeer~ftes

eel:l:aeeral
~ftvelv~ft~

er

e£ ene law e£ ene ease 7 res

;~eieaea

er

est:e~~el;

er ~n a er~m~al aee~en er ~reeeed~ft~
ene same de£endafte er a d~se~~liftar~ aee~eft

~reeeea~n~ ~nvelvin~

ene same

res~eftaeftt

as provided in

subdivision (b) of this ruZe.
(b)
[Ezceptions] An opinion noz published, certified
for publication, or.> ordered pubZ.ished in -the QfficiaZ Reports
may be ci-ted in another actio~ ~n the following situations:
(1) In connection with a pe-tition for hearing proceeding before the Supreme Court whenever it appears -that an unpubZ.ished opinion of a Court af Appeal conflicts with -the
decision or order in which a hearing is sought.
(2) When the opinion of an appelZ.ate department of the
superior court is reZ.evant to an ac-tion or proceeding before
that appeZZ.ate department, or before a municipal. or justice
court within the same county;
(3) When the opinion is relevant under the doctrines
of the Zaw of the case, res judicata, or coZ.ZateraZ estoppel.;
(4) When the opinion is reZ.evant to a criminal. action
or disciplinary proceeding involving the same party or a
member of the State Bar.
(c)
[Citation procedure] A copy of any opinion citabZ.e
under the exceptions specified in subdivision (b) of this
rule shaZZ be furnished to the court and aZZ. parties by attaching it to the document in which citation is made, or, if
the citation is to be made oraZZy, i;hen within a reasonabZ.e
time in advance of citation.

*

~n~e r~ie

ena±i nee appiy ee an

ep~n*en eerei£~ed

eae~en pr~er ee ~ee aeettai p~bi~eae~en~
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£er

p~bli

Rule 978c

Requesting publication of unpublished opinions

{a)
[Request procedure; action by court rendering
opinion] A request by any person for publication in the
Official Reports of an opinion not certified for publication
may be made only to the court that rendered the opinion.
The request shall be made promptly by letter, with a copy to
each party to the action or proceeding not joining therein,
stating concisely why the opinion meets one or more of the
criteria for publication in rule 976. If the court does
not, or by reason of the decision's finality as to that
court cannot, grant the request, the court may, and at the
instance of the person requesting publication shall, transmit
the request and a copy of the opinion to the Supreme Court
with its recommendation for appropriate disposition and a
brief statement of its reasons therefor. The transmitting
court shaZl also send a copy of itP recommendation and
statement of Peasons to each

par~y

ceeding and to any other person

~ho

to the action or prohas requested pubZication.

{b)
[Action by Supreme Court] When a request for
publication is received by the Supreme Court £rem ~fte
ee~r~ ~ftat reftaerea tfte e~ift~eft pursuant to subdivision (a)
of this ruZe the Supreme Court shall either order the opinion published or deny the request. Such requests shall be
acted upon

promptly~

and each party to the action or pro-

ceeding and any person who has requested publication shall
be notified of the action taken by the Court.
{c)

Rule 29.

* * *
Grounds for hearing in Supreme Court; comment
on denial of hearing

(a) -

(c)

(b)

* * *

[Comment on denial of hearing]

Upon denial of

hearing in a Court of Appeal case in which the opinion is
published the Supreme Court may expressly withhoZd its
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approval of or otherwise aomment on the whole or any part of
a Court of Appeal opinion~ provided that the failure of the
Supreme Court to do so shall not be deemed an approval
thereof. Suah expressions and aomments shall be published
in the Offiaial Reports~ and shall appear immediately following the Court of Appeal opinion to whiah they are addressed.
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APPENDIX B
STORAGE/RETRIEVAL TECHNOLOGIES FOR
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
Two legal publishers and a computerized legal research service made presentations to the committee concerning storage/retrieval technologies now available for legal
materials$ At least two major types of storage/retrieval
equipment are currently available--miniaturizing technologies
like microfilm/microfiche and computer memory systems. The
former system is used for storage of full text federal tax
letter rulings in the ~ Letter Rulings Reporter published
by Commerce Clearing House, Inc., of Chicago. In this system, subscribers receive weekly mailings in full-size print;
these include the full-text rulings and topical indexes and
citators. When his binder is full, the subscriber may replace
the full-size text of the rulings with "microfiche" or "ultrafiche" copies. This reduces storage volume to 1/42 (microfiche)
[42X] or 1/75 (ultrafiche) [75X] of the originals. Indexes and
citators are retained in full-size format for ease of access. 1 /
A representative of NILS Publishing Company made a
presentation comparing different microform formats. In his
opinion, 75X is not standard and is hard to read. He favors
48X, or even 24X. Assuming about 56,000 pages of unpublished
. opinions a year, one year's output could be stored on 56 7:SX
fiches (1,000 pages per fiche), or 134 48X fiches (420 pages
per fiche).
Viewers for microfiche are estimated to cost around
$200-$300, and viewer/printers capable to producing full-sized

1/
-

At the committee's request, CCH prepared a rough estimate
of the cost of such a subscription to unpublished California Court of Appeal opinions. Assuming 1,000 subscribers,
a full-sized topical index and citators, and full-sized
opinion text running to 56,000 pages/year iBsued biweekly
and replaced periodically by microfiche or ultrafiche,
a subscription would cost roughly $400 annually. With
microfiche opinion text only, the subscription would cost
about $200. Each year's output would fill about 50 fiches
at 75X.
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copy of a microform document cost between $1,500 and $3,000. 2 /
Computer data storage and retrieval is exemplified
by the LEXIS Service of Mead Data Central, two of whose representatives made a presentation to the committee. This
system uses no index/lexicon. Rather, the user chases any
word, phrase,or group of words, and the computer identifies
all opinions containing the word(s)/phrase and for each presents to the user a block of text surrounding any such use
{including a number of words before and after the target words) •
The user can also get the computer to print out the entire text
3/
. .
o f any op~n~on.The committee's tentative impression is that the
microform technology is more promising than computers for
handling unpublished opinions. Microform appears cheaper to
both government and userse It can al~o reproduce the actual
text of unpublished opinions, thereby giving a guarantee of
authenticity that is not available in a computer printout.
(Theproblem of authentic copies may be serious in the unpublished opinion field, for there is no official report to turn
to for easy confirmation.)
Nevertheless, in the committee's judgment there is
much uncertainty, and nore_thorough study of these matters
is reguired.
2/ In the opinion of the NILS Publishing representative, a
service with full-text opinions and indexes, with the
opinions replaceable after one year with microfiche, would
cost roughly $1,250 per year on a subscriber base of 6,000.
y The Mead representatives estimated that the unpublished
output of the California Courts of Appeal could be keyed
and loaded into the LEXIS memory for about $200,000 per
year, assuming 60,000 pages per year and stored as a
nprivate library" for about $20,000 'a year. Each user
would presumably rent a terminal, and there would be charges
for this and for use to search and retrieve opinions.
(There is one public LEXIS ter~minaL in Kansas, which charges
up to $50 per use.)
The NILS Publishing representative predicted that microcomputers with tape and an index system will soon be available and be far less costly to the user than on-line systems like LEXIS.
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APPENDIX C
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
I.

Authorities that Generally Favor One or More Aspects
of Selective Publication
American Bar Association Commission on Standards of
Judicial Administration (1977) Standards Relating
to Appellate Courts (see pp. 62-65) [state and
federal courts] [opposes noncitation]
California State Bar, Conference Committee Report
~ 1974 Conference Resolution No. 11-18 (1976) 51
State Bar J. 400 [Cal. state courts]
[contains some criticismsJ
California State Bar (1973) Supplemental Report of
the Special Committee on Appellate Courts: TheCitat~on of Unpublishea-opinions [Cal. state~urts]
California State Bar (1972) Report of the Special
Committee on Appellate Courts: The Citation of
Unpublishea-opinions [Cal. state~urts]
Chanin, A Survey of the Writing and Publication of
Opinions ~ the-pe&eral and State Appellate Courts
(1974) 67 Law Lib. J. 362 [state and federal courts]
Committee on Selective Publication of Appellate
Court Opinions (1973) Report [in support of rule
977] [Cal. state courts]
Committee on Selective Publication of Appellate
Court Opinions (1971) Report [in support of amendments to rule 976] [Cal. state courts]
Frank, Remarks before the Ninth Circuit Judicial
Conference (1977) 16 The Judges' Journal 10
[federal courts]
Gardner, The Perils of Publication (1977) 4 Orange
County Bar J. 7 [Cal. state courts]
Gustafson, Some Observations about California
Courts of-xppeal (1971) 19 u.c.L.A. L.Rev. 167 (see
pp. 204-207) [Cal. state courts]
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Joiner, Limiting Publication of Judicial Opinions
(1972) 56 Judicature 195 [state and federal courts]
Leavitt, The Yearly Two-Foot Shelf (1973) 4 Pacific
L.J. 1 (see pp. 22-26) [cal. state courts]
R. Leflar, Appellate Judicial Opinions (ed. 1974)
(see p. 309) {state and federal courts]
Leflar, The Washington Court of Appeals, 32 Wash.
St. B. News (Nov. 1978) pp.-r0-21 [Wash. state
courts]
Leventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork
and Managed Flexibility (1976) 23 U.C.L.A. L.Rev.
m (see pp. 436-439) [federal courts]
Seligson & Warnlof, The Use of Unreported Cases in
California (1972) ~Hast.:L.J. 39 [Cal~ state courts]
Smith, The Selective Publication of Opinions: One
Court~Exper~ence (1978) 32 Ar~L.Rev. 26 [Ark.
state courts]
B. Witkin, Manual on Appellate Court Opinions (1977)
(sec pp. 23-38) TCal. state courts] [includes
criticism of standards]
II.

Authorities that Generally Oppose One or More Aspects
of Selective Publication
P. Carrington, D. Meader, M. Rosenberg, Justice on
Appeal (1976) (see pp. 35-41) [state and federai
courts]
Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh
CircuitTs Non-PUbliCatron-Rule-rl9/7f 39~P~tt.L.Rev.
608 [federal courts]
---Comment, Publish or Perish: The Destiny of Appellate
Opinions ~n Californ~a (197~13 Santa Clara Lawyer 756 [Cal. state courts]
Do Unpublished Decisions Hamper Justice? (1978) 64
A.B.A.J. 318 {state and federal courts]
Coleman, To Publish or not to Publish--That is the
Questiofi; Sexual Law Reporter, March/Apr~l-r9~
[Cal. state courts]
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Gardner, The Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions:
Denial of Equal Justice? (1975) 61 A.B.A.Jo 1224
[federalcourts]
Goodwin, Partial Publication: A Proposal for a
Chanc;re ~n the "Packag~ng" of Cal~forn~a CoUrt of
Appeal opiniOns to Provid~ More Useful Information
for the Consumer (1979) 19 Santa Clara Lawyer 53
[Cal:-8tate courts]
·
Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the
Publication of Appellate Court-opin~ons (19isr-27 Stanford E7Rev. 791 [state and federal courts]
Kanner, The Unpublished Opinion: Friend ~ Foe?
(1973) 48 State Bar J. 386 [Cal. state courts]
Lascher, Lascher at Large (1975) 50 State Bar J.
36 [Cal. state courts]
Newbern and Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedent and the
Disappearing Court (1978) 32 Ark.L.Rev. 37 [Ark.
state courts]
Note, Decertification of Appellate Opinions: The
Need for Articulated-yudicial Reasoning and certain
PreCedent in Cal~fornia Law (1977) 50 So.Cal.L.Rev.
1181 [Cal.-state courts]--Note, Selective Publication of Case Law (1966) 39
So.Cal.L.Rev. 608 [Cal. state-courts]
Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts
of Appeals {1977) 63 Cornel1~Rev. 128 [federal
courts]
Reynolds and Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent
--Limited Publication-and Non-C~tat~on Rules ~n the
Un~ted States Courtsof-xppeals (1978) 78 Colum.L:Rev.
1167 [federal courts]
Rubin, Views from the Lower Court (1976) 23 U.C.L.A.
L.Rev. 448 (see pp. 451-453) [Cal. state courts]
Silverman, The Unwritten Law: The Unpublished Opinion
in California (1976) 51 state Bar J. 33
TCal. state courts]

58

Stern, The Enigma of Unpublished Opinions (1978) 64
A.B.A.J. 1245 [federal courts]

Thompson, Mitigating the Dama2e: One Judge and No
Judge Opinions (197-s-r-50 State Bar J. 476
(see p. 480) [Cal. state courts]
Weisgall, StoE, Search and Seize: The Emerging
Doctrine of Unfounded Susf~c~on (1974) 9 U.S.F.L.Rev.
219 (see pp. -253-254) [Ca • state courts]
Walther, The Noncitation Rule and the Concept of
Stare Decisis (1978) 61 Marquette L.Rev. 581
[Wiscons~n state courts]
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APPENDIX D
ORGANIZATIONS AND BUSINESSES CONTACTED
The committee invited the following groups
and concerns to present their views concerning selective
publication:
Judges, Judicial Personnel, Judicial Administration Centers
Selected Presiding Justices and Administrative
Presiding Justices of the California Courts
of Appeal
California Judges Association
Selected Superior Court Judges
Judicial Attorneys of California
Selected Clerks of Courts of Appeal
Municipal Clerks Association
Trial Court Administrators Association
Selected judicial administration centers
Executive and Legislative Bodies
Governor's Legal Affairs Office
Selected Legislative Committees
Department of Consumer Affairs
County Supervisors Association ·
Los Angeles Consumer Affairs Department
Office of Criminal Justice Planning
Lawyers, Public Interest Firms, Bar Associations
California State Bar Section Chairpersons, and selected
Committee Chairpersons
Legal aid, legal assistance and legal services
offices throughout California
Presidents of county bar associations, specialized bars,
and geographical bar associations
California Academy of Appellate Lawyers
California Trial Lawyers Association
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Publishers, Research Services, Data Processing Concerns,
Computer Companies, Microfilm Services, Etc.
A. B. Dick Company
Ampex Memory Products Division
Attorneys Printing Supply
BDS Computer Corporation
Braegen Corporation
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
C.E.S. Corporation
The Cambridge Systems Group
Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
Continuing Education of the Bar
Datagraphix
Devoke Company
George Lithograph Company
Hewlett Packard
Infor;..latics, Inc.
Information Access Corporation
Information Handling Services
International Data Corporation
Jurisearch, Inc.
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.
Memo rex
NILS Publishing Company
Parker & Sons Publication, Inc.
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
The Service Bureau Company
Sperry-Univac Mini-Computer Operations
3M Company
University Microfilm, Inc.
Varian Graphics
Wang Laboratories, Inc.
West Publishing Company
WSI Micrographics
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Prosecutors and Defenders
Attorney General
Appellate Defenders, Inc.
State Public Defender
California Public Defenders Association
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California District Attorneys Association
Law Schools and Law Libraries
Law schools throughout California
Selected law school libraries
State Law Library
Selected county law libraries
American Association of Law Librarians
Legal and General Press
Legal newspapers throughout California
California and major national dailies and
periodicals
Judicial administration publications
Citizen Groups
California Labor Federation
League of Women Voters
Consumer Federation of California
League of California Cities
California Citizens Action Group
California Taxpayers Association
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APPENDIX E
MEMBERS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AN
EFFECTIVE PUBLICATION RULE
The parenthetical entries indicate members' prior
public involvement, if any, in the specific subject of
selective publication.
Hon. Thomas W. Caldecott, Co-Chairperson
Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four {member of Committee on Se~ective Publication of Appellate Court Opinions created in
1970 by Chief Justice Wright).
Mr. Sheldon Portman, Co-Chairperson
Public Defender, Santa Clara County (member of
State Bar Publication Review Committee and proponent of
Santa Clara County Bar Association recommendations ~ publication of criminal cases, Supreme Court decertification).
Hon. Robert Gardner
Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two (author of The Perils of Publication (1977) 4 Orange County Bar J. 7).
Hon. Bernard

s.

Jefferson

Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four (author of separate opinion in
People v. Valenzuela (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 427, 433, dealing
with validity and wisdom of rule 977 as applied to unpublished opinions of the Appellate Department of the Los
Angeles Superior Court).
Hon. Vaino H. Spencer
Judge of the Superior Court, Los Angeles County.
Hon. Homer B. Thompson
Judge of the Superior Court, Santa Clara County.
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Mr. Michael M. Berger
Attorney at Law, Santa Monica.
Rev. William G. Cunningham
Past Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara.
Ms. Gloria deHart
Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco.

Mr. Robert Formichi
Reporter of Decisions, San Francisco.

(One of staff

to Committee on Selective Publication of Appellate Court
Opinions created in 1970 by Chief Justice Wright.)
Mr. Joseph Freitas, Jr.
District Attorney, City and County of San Francisco.

Mr. Ellis J. Horvitz
Attorney at Law, Encino (member of State Bar Special Commit~ee on Appellate Courts that prepared Supplemental Report (1973) Citation of Unpublished Opinions) •

Mr. Myron Jacobstein
Law Librarian, Stanford University (author of Some
Reflections on the Control of Publication of Appellate Court
Opinions (1975) 27 Stanford L.Rev. 791).
Mr. Gideon Kanner
Professor, Loyola of Los Angeles Law School (author of The Unpublished Opinion: Friend or Foe? (1973) 48
State Bar J. 386; Chairperson of State Bar Publication Review
Committee)
Mr. Edward L. Lascher
Attorney at Law, Ventura; former State Bar Vice
President (author of comments on selective publication in
column Lascher at Large, e.g., (1975) 50 State Bar J. 36.
Mr. Roderick Rose
Chairman of the Board, Bancroft-Whitney Company
(publisher of official reports; provided estimates of number
of volumes needed to publish all Court of Appeal opinions).
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Mr. Leonard Sacks
Attorney at Law, Encino (member of State Bar
Publication Review Committee)
Mr. Charles M. Sevilla
Chief Assistant

State Public Defender, Los Angeles.
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